The majority quotes testimony of caseworker James that Williams told her on Monday that she "would have to take [Sarah] to the hospital,” and deduces from that testimony that Williams made the decision on Monday. But James' categorical testimony on this point establishes that she did not act on Monday because the decision could only be made by Williams, i.e., the decision and order to act had not happened.

"Although the CWA maintains an emergency children's services unit that is on call nights and weekends, no one contacted it about the Tenenbaum situation.” Majority Opinion at 590.

Some of these eases addressed qualified immunity, rather than the underlying constitutional claim. As we have recently noted, however, the cases in this area typically collapse the two inquiries, so the qualified immunity cases are directly relevant to this discussion. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107 & n. 10.

Another passage in the majority opinion also has this unintended effect of increasing the risks of child abuse. The majority opinion strongly implies that the defendants in this case should have complied with New York’s statute governing ''preliminary” removal orders. See Majority Opinion at 590-91 & n.6 (citing N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022). Although such an order can be obtained ex parte, the officer seeking it must make a notice showing, i.e., either that "the parent or other person legally responsible” for the child is "absent” or that the parent refused to consent to the child's temporary removal. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022(a); see also id. % 1023; In re Adrian J., 119 Misc.2d 900, 464 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (1983) (finding § 1022 order "jurisdictionally defective” and therefore a "nullity” when child protection workers "failed to ask [parents] to consent to a temporary removal of the child”). The majority opinion thus has the effect of imposing a constitutional requirement of parental notice. It is worth pointing out that while the child welfare worker is seeking the order, the child will presumably remain in the custody of the alleged abuser, who is thereby alerted to the accusation and has time to coach the child, or take other measures. I cannot agree that the Constitution requires resort to the New York statute even when a child is in objective danger of harm. Cf. Robison, 821 F.2d at 923 ("Federal constitutional standards rather than state statutes define the requirements of procedural due process.”).

"[M]y decision was that [Sarah] should be removed from the school and taken to Coney Island Hospital, specifically to be examined to rule out sexual abuse.” "Q: [Y]ou removed or had Sarah removed because you wanted to have a medical examination done to determine whether or not she had been sexually abused; is that correct? A: That is correct.” * "I was doing [the exam] to determine whether or not the child had been sexually abused.”

Section 1022 provides that under certain circumstances the family court may enter an order directing the temporary removal of a child from the place where he or she is residing. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022.

Counsel for the defendants on this appeal conceded at oral argument that "perhaps, in *591this case, a court order if sought could have been obtained on that day.”

Section 2.2 of the Regulation of the Chancellor relating to Reports of Suspected Child Abuse and Maltreatment then in effect read in part: "The school must permit Child Protective Services workers to take children into their custody, upon their presentation of either a court order or a written statement from the Office of Special Services for Children.”

The defendants do not argue that the school’s routine consent to Sarah’s removal and, by implication, her later physical examination were effective as a substitute for parental consent. We do not think that they were. Although public school children have been said to be "committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster,” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that public schools generally "act in loco parentis in their dealings with students: [that] their authority is that of the parent.... Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of th[e] Court.” New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). If it were otherwise, a public school could in effect consent to its own infringements of students' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights thereby rendering these rights meaningless as against the school. The Supreme Court has held to the contrary that a public school is an agency of the State subject to constitutional scrutiny when it performs a search with respect to a student. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37, 105 S.Ct. 733. The handing over of a child from a public school teacher to another State official, then, is not the equivalent of the consent of the parents. See Gardiner v. Incorporated Village of Endicott, 50 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir.1995) ("The parties agree that in light of [a parent’s] constitutionally protected liberty interest in the custody of her child, [the child] could not be removed from school by ... police officers, absent a court order, an emergency, or parental consent.”). The extent to which a private person or institution with temporary caretaking responsibilities for a child may effectively consent to a government official’s removal of the child and her subsequent physical examination is not in issue in this case. We intimate no views on the question.

We thus do not hold, expressly or implicitly, as the dissent suggests, see dissent, post, at 611 n. 4, that notice to parent or guardian is constitutionally required.

We do not read the Tenenbaums' complaint or their appeal papers to contend that the medical examination performed on Sarah itself violated the substantive rights afforded by the Due Process Clause and we therefore do not address that issue.

It is plain to us if not to the dissenting judge, see dissent, post, at 612-13, that if the time for which a child is held is extended in order to permit resort to the courts, that extension of time will not convert the seizure from a lawful one to one that infringes the substantive due-process rights of the child or his or her parents.

"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). But see J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 928 (10th Cir.1997) (there may be circumstances in which a parent has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the seizure of his or her minor child). The district court held that the Tenenbaums did not have standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim in their own behalf with respect to the State's treatment of Sarah. We do not read their appeal papers to challenge this conclusion.

The Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions are applicable to the defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

We thus need not decide, as the district court did, for example, whether caseworkers evbr have “special needs” that would permit them to base a removal of a child on information from an anonymous source contrary to ordinary probable cause jurisprudence. See Tenenbaum I, 862 F.Supp. at 975-76.

The majority quotes testimony of caseworker James that Williams told her on Monday that she "would have to take [Sarah] to the hospital,” and deduces from that testimony that Williams made the decision on Monday. But James' categorical testimony on this point establishes that she did not act on Monday because the decision could only be made by Williams, i.e., the decision and order to act had not happened.

"Although the CWA maintains an emergency children's services unit that is on call nights and weekends, no one contacted it about the Tenenbaum situation.” Majority Opinion at 590.

Some of these eases addressed qualified immunity, rather than the underlying constitutional claim. As we have recently noted, however, the cases in this area typically collapse the two inquiries, so the qualified immunity cases are directly relevant to this discussion. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107 & n. 10.

Another passage in the majority opinion also has this unintended effect of increasing the risks of child abuse. The majority opinion strongly implies that the defendants in this case should have complied with New York’s statute governing ''preliminary” removal orders. See Majority Opinion at 590-91 & n.6 (citing N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022). Although such an order can be obtained ex parte, the officer seeking it must make a notice showing, i.e., either that "the parent or other person legally responsible” for the child is "absent” or that the parent refused to consent to the child's temporary removal. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1022(a); see also id. % 1023; In re Adrian J., 119 Misc.2d 900, 464 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (1983) (finding § 1022 order "jurisdictionally defective” and therefore a "nullity” when child protection workers "failed to ask [parents] to consent to a temporary removal of the child”). The majority opinion thus has the effect of imposing a constitutional requirement of parental notice. It is worth pointing out that while the child welfare worker is seeking the order, the child will presumably remain in the custody of the alleged abuser, who is thereby alerted to the accusation and has time to coach the child, or take other measures. I cannot agree that the Constitution requires resort to the New York statute even when a child is in objective danger of harm. Cf. Robison, 821 F.2d at 923 ("Federal constitutional standards rather than state statutes define the requirements of procedural due process.”).

"[M]y decision was that [Sarah] should be removed from the school and taken to Coney Island Hospital, specifically to be examined to rule out sexual abuse.” "Q: [Y]ou removed or had Sarah removed because you wanted to have a medical examination done to determine whether or not she had been sexually abused; is that correct? A: That is correct.” * "I was doing [the exam] to determine whether or not the child had been sexually abused.”