United States v.
Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398 (1888) (enforcing one of the predecessors of 1 U. S. C. § 109);
Allen v.
Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 553-555 (1954);
Moorehead v.
Hunter, 198 F. 2d 52 (CA10 1952);
Lovely v.
United States, 175 F. 2d 312, 316-318 (CA4 1949);
Rehberg v.
United States, 174 F. 2d 121 (CA5 1949);
Ladner v.
United States, 168 F. 2d 771 (CA5 1948). 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §2048 (1943 ed.). See also
Fleming v.
Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U. S. 111, 119 (1947);
Duffel v.
United States, 95 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 221 F. 2d 523 (1954); cf.
United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 331-333 (1936);
United States v.
Hark, 320 U. S. 531 (1944) (reversing an order quashing an indictment charging violation of maximum price regulation that had been revoked prior to the date the indictment was returned on the ground that the statute under which the regulation was issued remained in effect after revocation). In
United States v.
Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934), this Court was faced with the question of what effect repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment by the Twenty-first Amendment on December 5, 1933, would have on criminal prosecutions continued or begun under the National Prohibition Act after the repealing amendment had been ratified. In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court applied the common-law rule of
Tynen and
Yeaton and held that pending prosecutions, including those still on direct review, would be abated. The question of whether the Twenty-first Amendment had any effect on convictions which had become final before the date of ratification was specifically reserved. 291 U. S., at 226. Thereafter, the courts of appeals held that defendants whose convictions had become final before the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified had to serve their sentences.
United States ex rel. Randall v. United States Marshal, 143 F. 2d 830 (CA2 1944);
Odekirk v.
Ryan, 85 F. 2d 313 (CA6 1936);
United States ex rel. Cheramie v.
Dutton, 74 F. 2d 740 (CA5 1935), cert. denied
sub nom. United States ex rel. Cheramie v.
Freudenstein, 295 U. S. 733 (1935);
Rives v.
O’Hearne, 64 App. D. C. 48, 73 F. 2d 984 (1934);
Moss v.
United States, 72 F. 2d 30 (CA4 1934);
The Helen, 72 F. 2d 772 *740(CA3 1934) (common-law rule of
Chambers applied to a forfeiture);
United States ex rel. Benton v.
Hill, 72 F. 2d 826 (CA3 1934);
United States ex rel. Voorhees v.
Hill, 72 F. 2d 826 (CA3 1934);
United States ex rel. Nerbonne v.
Hill, 70 F. 2d 1006 (CA3 1934). In
Chambers, the Court rejected the Government’s suggestion that the general saving provision' — the predecessor of § 109 — supported the continuation of prosecutions pending when the repealing amendment was ratified. The saving statute was discussed as passed in recognition of the principle that unless a repealed law is “continued in force by competent authority,” 291 U. S., at 224, repeal halts enforcement. Congress had the power to propose the Twenty-first Amendment so as to include a saving provision, but not to vary the amendment’s terms once it was adopted. Since as adopted the amendment gave Congress no power to extend the operation of the National Prohibition Act, which was deprived of its force by the action of the people in repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that the general saving provision had no application.
Ibid. There can be no doubt that a Court which had just decided
Great Northern R. Co. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932), would consider the judiciary as “competent authority” to fashion a rule that a statute, though changed by • interpretation, nevertheless remained in force and applicable to events that transpired before the change occurred. See nn. 6-7,
infra, and accompanying text.