Turner v. Garrels, No. 24-0895 (Sept. 4, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Alivonta Deneil TURNER v. Ariana Elizabeth GARRELS
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Iowa (IA)
Court
Iowa Supreme Court
Decided
Sept. 4, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Telleen (J.) (unanimous Court)
Turner v. Garrels, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2537738Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: FINAL PUBLICATION DECISION PENDINGCourt of Appeals of Iowa.Alivonta Deneil TURNER, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Ariana Elizabeth GARRELS, Defendant-Appellee.No. 24-0895|Filed September 4, 2025Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,Christopher Bruns, Judge.A father appeals the district court's custody order grantingthe mother physical care and sole legal custody to their child.AFFIRMED.Attorneys and Law FirmsAlivonta De Neil Turner, Cedar Rapids, self-representedappellant.Thomas J. Viner of Viner Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, forappellee.Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Langholz,J., and Telleen, S.J.*OpinionTELLEEN, Senior Judge.*1 Alivonta Deneil Turner appeals the district court'scustody order granting Ariana Elizabeth Garrels physicalcare and sole legal custody to their child. In addition toarguments regarding the custody and physical care issues,Turner argues that Iowa Code section 610.1 (2022), whichprovides the fee for ordering the transcript of the districtcourt proceedings cannot be deferred, is unconstitutionaland that requiring him to pay the transcript fee violates hisconstitutional rights. Because Turner has waived all issues hehas raised on appeal,1 we affirm the district court's order.I. Background Facts and ProceedingsIn February 2022, Turner petitioned to establish custody, care,visitation, and support over the child born of his relationshipwith Ariana Garrels.2 He requested joint legal custodyand shared physical care of the child, and that Garrels beresponsible for attorney fees and court costs.Trial was held on the petition in March 2024. In large part,that trial revolved around questions as to whether and towhat extent Turner had engaged in acts of domestic assaultagainst Garrels. The district court concluded that in or around2017, “there was an assault on [Garrels] by [Turner],” Turner“made contact with [Garrels]’s face in some sort of offensivemanner,” he waved a knife at Garrels in “a threateningmanner” and “made show of” carrying a pistol, and Turner“threatened [Garrels] with potential harm from the pistol.”Turner was arrested following the incident with the pistol anddisappeared from the child's life for months at a time whileGarrels cared for the child.*2 Turner later filed the petition to establish custody, care,visitation, and support. A temporary matters hearing washeld in May 2022, and the district court awarded Garrelsphysical care. Turner was granted supervised visitation,which eventually progressed to unsupervised visitation.Following the March 2024 trial, the district court concludedthat Turner had spent much of the time under the temporaryorder attempting to undermine Garrels's role as a parent. Hehas also “engaged in a campaign to intimidate [Garrels] inregard to her relationship with her current boyfriend” and“falsely accuse[d] [Garrels] of having sexual relations withher current attorney.” The district court also found Turnerinsists that “[Garrels] should not have [the child] at the lawoffice where [Garrels] works” because “the [law] office isa cultist type environment.” And during the period underthe temporary order, Turner escalated a disagreement overwhat swimsuit the child should wear to the point that lawenforcement was called and forced to “broker a resolution infront of [the child].”The district court expressly found thatthere is a history of domestic abuse of [Garrels] by[Turner]. Although [Turner] has been unable to carry outfurther acts of physical abuse since [Garrels] separatedfrom him and since the temporary orders were modified torequire exchanges at the Cedar Rapids Police Department,he did commit such acts before the separation. Further, hisbehavior since the temporary orders were issued, when heknew the court was watching, have reflected the efforts atintimidation and control that typify domestic abuse.
Turner v. Garrels, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Because [Garrels] has established a history of domesticabuse, the presumption in this case becomes one of solelegal custody to [Garrels] with visitation to [Turner].The district court further found that the parties regularlydisagree relating to healthcare and schooling issues. Thecourt was skeptical the parties would improve their parentingrelationship moving forward based on the “extremelyacrimonious” period under the temporary order. Thus,it concluded, “[w]hen it comes to which parent shouldbe awarded sole legal custody or primary care, theapproximation rule overwhelming favors an award to[Garrels].” This is due to the fact that Garrels has alwaysbeen the primary breadwinner and caretaker, and “[the child]is doing very well under [Garrels]’s care. She is performingvery well at school other than a significant number ofabsences. She is relatively healthy. She appears to be verywell adjusted.”In April 2024, the district court awarded Garrels solelegal custody and physical care of the child, with regularscheduled visitation granted to Turner. The district court alsoassessed monthly child support against Turner and made himresponsible for court costs.On April 30, Turner filed this appeal. In September, Garrelsmoved to dismiss Turner's appeal due to Turner's failure toorder a transcript by the August 10 deadline to do so. Turnerresponded to Garrels's motion by asserting “good cause”for the delay due to financial hardship. He also moved forwaiver of transcript costs. On October 3, our supreme courtdenied Garrels's motion to dismiss and ordered Turner topay the transcript fee within fourteen days. Turner respondedto the supreme court order by requesting the supreme courtreconsider its denial of his request for a transcript fee waiver,broadly asserting a constitutional guarantee to access tojustice regardless of financial circumstances.In November, the supreme court then entered an orderdirecting that this appeal “should proceed without preparationof the transcript,” noting that under Iowa Code section 610.1,“the transcript fee cannot be deferred.” The supreme courtdetermined that “[i]n addition to any other arguments theappellant raises in his appellate brief, the parties shall brief theissue of whether requiring payment of the transcript violatesthe appellant's constitutional rights.”The parties subsequently filed their appellate briefs.II. Standard of ReviewWe review orders involving child custody and child supportde novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (IowaCt. App. 2020). We also review constitutional challengesde novo. In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa1997). “While we are not bound by the fact-findings of thedistrict court, we give them weight, especially as to credibilitydeterminations.” Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5.III. Discussion*3 Turner raises numerous issues on appeal. Several ofhis arguments are limited to topic headings, and all theissues he raises contain only cursory reference to legalauthority. These two-to-three-sentence argument sections donot sufficiently facilitate our review. Vague assertions thatthe district court ruling “violates due process and equalprotection” and “undermined the overall fairness of the trial”without citation to authority or reference to the record do notmeaningfully identify findings of fact or conclusions of lawwith which Turner disagrees. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a) (8).And “[t]o the extent he sufficiently formulates argument[s]for the first time in his reply brief, we do not consider [them].”See Goebel v. Green Line Polymers, Inc., No. 18-1244, 2019WL 4678169, at *3 n.8 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2019); IowaR. App. P. 6.903(4) (“Issues may not be asserted for thefirst time in the reply brief.”). Turner has divided his replybrief into (1) sections replying to the appellee brief, and (2)sections setting forth his primary arguments. That approachis contrary to our appellate rule governing reply briefs—that rule establishes that the reply brief is meant to “replyto the brief of the appellee,” not to establish one's primaryarguments on appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(4).Despite his waiver of all issues, we nonetheless do our best tointerpret and address the arguments raised in the “Argument”section of Turner's appellant's brief without conducting hisresearch for him.A. Constitutional ViolationsIowa Code section 610.1 provides that “[t]his section doesnot allow the deferral of the cost of a transcript.” Turnerargues that “[b]y taxing costs to [Turner] and requiringtranscript fees” pursuant to Iowa Code section 610.1 that “hecannot afford, the final decree effectively denies meaningfulappellate review,” and “[i]mposing full court costs on
Turner v. Garrels, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3[Turner], who lacks sufficient resources, violates due processand equal protection” under the United States Constitution.The lone legal authority Turner cites for both of thesearguments comes from M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111–12 (1996).Turner fails to delineate how M.L.B. supports his positionbeyond that “fundamental rights cannot be conditionedon wealth” and that “states cannot place insurmountablefinancial barriers on appeals involving parental rights.” Butwe can easily distinguish M.L.B. from Turner's case. QuotingLassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27(1981), the M.L.B. Court recognized a “narrow category ofcivil cases in which the State must provide access to itsjudicial processes without regard to a party's ability to paycourt fees,” particularly where “the object of the proceedingis ‘not simply to infringe upon the parent's interest’ ” in thechild, “but to end it.” 519 U.S. at 117–18 (cleaned up). TheCourt expressly stated that it was answering the followingquestion, “Does the Fourteenth Amendment require [theState] to accord [the appellant] access to an appeal—availablebut for her inability to advance required costs—before she isforever branded unfit for affiliation with her children?” Id. at119 (emphasis added).Here, unlike in M.L.B., Turner was not at threat of havinghis parental rights terminated. Instead the district courtwas tasked with assessing child support, custody, care andvisitation over his child pursuant to chapters 600B and 598of the Iowa Code. And the relief Turner requests is reversalof court costs, reassessment of child support, enforcementof the district court's communication orders,3 and addressalof “ethical concerns regarding Garrels's counsel.” The issueslitigated and the relief sought by Turner fall far shortof the concerns with financial access to judicial processcontemplated by the M.L.B. court.*4 Even if we were to determine that Turner sufficientlyraised this issue, we discern no violation of Turner'sconstitutional rights by requiring him to abide by thesection 610.1 requirement to pay the cost of the districtcourt transcript, nor in the district court's order that he beresponsible for court costs.B. Other ArgumentsTurner argues the district court “failed to protect the child'sbest interests” and “does not sufficiently address potentialemotional harm to the child from extended alienation” byGarrels. Turner does not further describe what emotionalharm the district court failed to address, how it failed toprotect the child's best interests, or what relief he is seekingto correct those failures. This issue is waived.Turner next contends that “the trial court relied heavily ondisputed allegations of abuse dating to 2014 and 2017 withoutcorroboration” and that the court may not “base custodyfindings primarily on uncorroborated hearsay.” Turner fails toidentify any specific hearsay statements, cite any part of therecord, or make any argument in support of his interpretationof the facts. This issue is waived.Turner also takes issue with the district court imputinghim with an annual earning capacity of $31,200, arguing it“overlooked documented medical restrictions.” He does notcite to any portion of the record supporting his claim that he isunable to earn the income imputed or that medical conditionsinhibit his earning capacity to less than that assessed to himby the district court. This issue is waived.Lastly, Turner alleges that “potential conflicts of interest”exist between Garrels and her attorney and argues the districtcourt's failure to address “these issues undermined the overallfairness of the trial.” He provides no explanation for anysuch alleged conflicts of interest. Turner has also waivedthis issue. And contrary to Turner's claim, the district courtdirectly addressed his accusations of fraternization betweenGarrels and her attorney, finding his attempt “to falsely accuse[Garrels] of having sexual relations with her current attorney”to be borne out of a desire to control and intimidate Garrels.Because all of Turner's arguments are waived or meritlessto the extent they are properly raised, we affirm the districtcourt's decree.AFFIRMED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2537738 (Table)
Turner v. Garrels, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Footnotes*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2025).1Turner also filed a “motion to take judicial notice and supplement the record” during the pendency of thisappeal. Although we are permitted to take judicial notice on appeal, see State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d650, 655 (Iowa 2013), Turner does not identify how Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.801 would authorizesupplementing the record with the documents he seeks to introduce. And, in his motion, he does not describethose documents’ relevance to this appeal beyond broad, conclusory assertions that the interceding eventsdepicted in those documents “interfere[d] with [his] lawful visitation rights,” “reinforced a pattern of unequaltreatment and judicial bias,” displayed “misuse of judicial power,” and “demonstrate the chilling effect on aself-represented father.” We accordingly deny Turner's motion.Additionally, we note that Turner quoted at least one nonexistent case in his judicial-notice motion. It thusappears that Turner may have misused an artificial intelligence tool when preparing the motion. So weonce again “stress that self-represented litigants and attorneys alike have a duty to independently verify theauthenticity and veracity of all sources and assertations when relying on artificial intelligence tools to preparetrial or appellate court filings.” Luke v. State, No. 24-1421, 2025 WL 2237311, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6,2025). Although a pro se litigant is not subject to the same ethical duties as an attorney, we expect attorneysand pro se litigants to “all ... act with equal competence.” See Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).2Due to the lack of transcript in the record, we recite the facts and proceedings as described by the districtcourt in its written ruling and as evidenced by the filings available in the case pleadings binder.3It is unclear to us exactly what relief Turner is requesting when he asks that we “enforce communicationorders that protect [Turner]’s right to maintain a healthy relationship with the child.” In its decree, the districtcourt required that “[e]ach party shall cooperate and make every reasonable effort to allow reasonablecommunication by phone, Zoom, Skype, Facetime or similar video conferencing between the other parentand [the child]” and declined to require the use of a parenting application, recognizing that “[b]ecause thecourt has awarded [Garrels] sole legal custody, the need for communications has been significantly reduced.”We decline to further speculate what type of relief Turner expects in this respect.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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