Shaporov v. Levine (Sept. 25, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
D. New Jersey. ALEXANDER SHAPOROV v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW LEVINE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Jersey (NJ)
Court
New Jersey Supreme Court
Decided
Sept. 25, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2731460Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT FOR PUBLICATIONUnited States District Court, D. New Jersey.ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff,v.PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW LEVINE, et al., Defendants.No. 22cv1150 (EP) (LDW)|Filed 09/25/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citation referencesthat are incorrect or do not actually exist. These invalidcitations appeared in the original court opinion and have beenpreserved as written since they are part of the official record.Any links to these invalid citations have been removed.OPINIONEvelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.*1 Plaintiff Alexander Shaporov brings this action againstnamed Palisades Interstate Police Department (“PalisadesPD”) officers Matthew Levine (“PO Levine”), TimothyConboy (“PO Conboy”), Peter Wojcik (“PO Wojcik”), ScottBilotti (“PO Bilotti”), and Sergeant Gregory D. Kimbro,Jr. (“Sergeant Kimbro”), in their individual capacities(collectively, “Defendants”), as well as Palisades PD DoePolice Officers #1-10 and Palisades PD Supervisor DoePolice Officer #1 (“Unidentified Police Officers”). Plaintiff, aMedicaid investigator for the State of New York and auxiliarypolice officer with the Police Department of the City of NewYork (“N.Y.P.D.”), alleges that Defendants violated his civilrights when they arrested him for impersonating a policeofficer in March 2020. See D.E. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).Defendants move for summary judgment as to all remainingclaims in Plaintiff's Complaint. D.E. 100.1 Plaintiff opposes.D.E. 104 (“Opposition” or “Opp.”). Defendants reply. D.E.102 (“Reply”). The Court decides the Motion without oralargument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For thereasons set forth herein, the Court will GRANT Defendants’Motion and DISMISS the Unidentified Defendants from thisaction with prejudice.I. FACTS2A. The Stop and ArrestOn March 3, 2020, Plaintiff was driving a New York state-issued Ford Taurus en route to Albany for a training related tohis job as a Medicaid investigator. Ex. C to the Certificationof Victor A. Afanador, Esq. in Support of Motion, D.E. 101(“First Afanador Cert.”) at 48:4–50:12. At that time, Plaintiffalso served as an auxiliary member of the N.Y.P.D. SeeD.E. 100-2 (“Defs. SUF”) 19. Per the auxiliary N.Y.P.D.regulations in place on March 3, 2020, Plaintiff was notissued a firearm, was not permitted to make arrests, andwas instructed not to apprehend individuals he believed werecriminal suspects. Id. Plaintiff's left hand has, what Plaintiffcharacterizes as, a “deformity,”3 see, e.g., Ex. C to FirstAfanador Cert. (“Plaintiff Dep.”) at 72:23–73:4. See Ex. E tothe Declaration of William Igbokwe, D.E. 104-2 (“IgbokweDecl.”) (photograph of Plaintiff's left hand).At the time Plaintiff was driving to Albany, PO Levine was ongeneral patrol in his vehicle and was parked on an access roadon the northbound side of the Palisades Interstate Parkway.Defs. SUF 1. PO Levine testified that he observed theFord Taurus driven by Plaintiff traveling at a high rate ofspeed at around 11:00 AM. Id.; Ex. B to First Afanador Cert.(“Levine Dep.”) at 47:24–48:12, 51:11–19, 53:2–13, 59:23–60:7. Plaintiff remained in the left lane for approximatelyseveral hundred feet before PO Levine pulled out behind him,leading PO Levine to conduct a motor vehicle stop due toPlaintiff's failure to keep right. Defs. SUF ¶¶ 3–4.4*2 Though precisely what happened when PO Levine gotout of his vehicle and started questioning Plaintiff is indispute,5 the following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffrepresented to PO Levine that he was a police officer. Defs.SUF 10; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF 10. PO Levine respondedthat the form of identification from Plaintiff PO Levinereviewed was not police identification and then questionedPlaintiff about whether Plaintiff went to a police academy orcarried a gun, to which Plaintiff responded “yes.” Defs. SUF¶¶ 10–11; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF ¶¶ 10–11. PO Levine nextinformed Plaintiff that PO Levine needed to see identificationthat showed that Plaintiff was a police officer because theform of identification PO Levine had seen did not show thatPlaintiff was a police officer. Defs. SUF 12; Pl. Resp.to Defs. SUF 12. At some point in his questioning ofPlaintiff, PO Levine asked Plaintiff, “Are you currently apolice officer?” to which Plaintiff responded, “Not under New
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2York state law.” Ex. A to Igbokwe Decl. at 10:59:22–27.Over the course of the questioning, PO Levine saw formsof identification suggesting that Plaintiff worked in the NewYork Medicaid office and as an Auxiliary Sergeant for theN.Y.P.D. Auxiliary Police. Defs. SUF ¶¶ 9, 18; Pl. Resp. toDefs. SUF ¶¶ 9, 18.6PO Levine ultimately asked Plaintiff to step out of his vehicleand proceeded to pat Plaintiff down. Defs. SUF 14. POLevine also requested that other officers arrive at the scene,leading to the arrival of Sergeant Kimbro, PO Conboy, POWojcik, and PO Bilotti as backup. Id. Upon the arrival ofthe other officers, PO Levine informed Plaintiff that beinga medical inspector did not make Plaintiff a police officerand noted that Plaintiff only identified himself as a medicalinspector after PO Levine had finished questioning him. Id. 15. PO Levine also explained to the officers that Plaintiffhad initially told PO Levine that Plaintiff was a police officer,went to the police academy, and carried a gun, before tellingPO Levine that those representations were not true. Id. 16.In response to PO Levine's explanation, one of the officersstated that Plaintiff had presented himself as a police officerand should be arrested. Id. 17. Sergeant Kimbro believed theidentification provided by Plaintiff did not show that Plaintiffhad police powers and was not legitimate. Id. 20. SergeantKimbro was also of the view that Plaintiff should haveidentified himself as an auxiliary and stated the departmentfor which he worked. Id. 23. PO Conboy called the numberslisted on the back of one of the forms of identification Plaintiffhad provided to PO Levine and confirmed that Plaintiff wasan auxiliary member of the N.Y.P.D. and not, in PO Convey'sview, “a cop.” Ex. P to First Afanador Cert. at 22:36–22:44;Defs. SUF 21; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF 21.Plaintiff was eventually handcuffed and led to PO Levine'spolice vehicle. See Defs. SUF ¶¶ 24, 27. Plaintiff testified thatthe handcuffs used on him were too tight and left bruises. Id. 24. Dashcam footage from PO Levine's vehicle establishesthat Plaintiff never requested that PO Levine loosen thehandcuffs. Id. 25.7 Plaintiff did not undergo any medicaltreatment for the alleged bruises resulting from the handcuffs.Defs. SUF 26. While Plaintiff was in PO Levine's vehicle,PO Levine asked Plaintiff if he was alright, to which Plaintiffresponded by asking for the window to be opened because hewas hot. Id. 28. About eight minutes after Plaintiff requestedthat PO Levine open the window, PO Levine did so, whichPlaintiff recognized as complying with his request. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. The window remained open over the course of Plaintiff'stransfer to the police station until PO Levine closed it sothat PO Levine and Plaintiff could better communicate. Id. 31. While Plaintiff testified that he believed the temperatureon the date of his arrest was over 80 degrees, archivedweather data from the National Weather Service shows thatthe temperature was between 57 and 59 degrees in Alpine,New Jersey, near the area of the arrest. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Plaintiffalleges that his seatbelt in PO Levine's vehicle during histransfer to the police station was not properly secured and thathe was sliding in the backset due to PO Levine speeding anddoing U-turns, but Plaintiff never informed PO Levine thathis seatbelt was not securely fastened. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Plaintiffdid testify, however, that he asked PO Levine to slow downand that PO Levine complied with his request. Id. 35.*3 Plaintiff also testified that after his arrival at the Fort Leeprecinct with PO Levine, see Ex. G to First Afanador Cert. at2, he overheard Officer Levine discussing and laughing aboutPlaintiff's deformity with another officer. Opp. at 3–4 (citingPlaintiff Dep. at 122:24–124:10). Plaintiff also testified thatPO Levine joked about how he would fingerprint Plaintiff,after which Plaintiff explained how he had previously beenfingerprinted. Id.PO Levine ultimately issued Plaintiff tickets for Failure toKeep Right in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-82 (TicketNo. 003339) (“Failure to Keep Right Ticket”) and violationof Safety Glass Requirement under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:3-75(Ticket No. 003340) (“Safety Glass Requirement Ticket”).Defs. SUF 36 (citing Ex. G to First Afanador Cert.). Plaintiffwas also charged with Impersonating a Police Officer inviolation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-8B (Complaint-Summons0288-S-2020-000056). Id. 38 (citing Ex. I to First AfanadorCert. (“Initial Impersonation Complaint-Summons”)).B. Resolution of Tickets and ChargeOn October 20, 2020, Plaintiff—represented by counsel—entered into a plea agreement before the court of the PalisadesInterstate Park. Ex. K to First Afanador Cert., Requests forAdmission (“RFAs”) Nos. 6, 10, 12.8 In the Complaint-Summons signed by the municipal court judge on October20, 2020, the Impersonating a Police Officer in violationof N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-8B charge was listed as the“Original Charge” and Impersonating a Public Servant inviolation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-8A was listed as the“Amended Charge.” Ex. J to First Afanador Cert. (“RevisedImpersonation Complaint-Summons”) at 3. Plaintiff pledguilty to the Failure to Keep Right Ticket in exchange forthe dismissal of the Safety Glass Requirement Ticket and the
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons. See RFA Nos.10–11; Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons. As partof the October 20, 2020, plea agreement, Plaintiff stipulatedbefore the municipal court to probable cause with respectto the Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons. Id. No.13. Plaintiff's counsel reviewed with Plaintiff on October20, 2020, all charges, penalties, and rights implicated bythe resolution of the Failure to Keep Right Ticket, SafetyGlass Requirement Ticket, and the Revised ImpersonationComplaint-Summons. Id. No. 12.II. PROCEDURAL HISTORYOn March 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a ten-count Complaintbringing various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for falsearrest (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), unreasonableand excessive force (Count III), malicious prosecution (CountIV), failure to supervise (Count V), failure to intervene(Count IX), substantive due process violations (Count VII),procedural due process violations (Count VIII), and aMonell claim (Count VI). Compl. ¶¶ 57–138. Plaintiff alsobrought state law claims under the New Jersey State CivilRights Acts (“NJCRA”) for malicious abuse of process andmalicious prosecution (Count X). Id. ¶¶ 139–57. Plaintiffbrought each of the claims in his Complaint against SergeantKimbro, PO Levine, PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, PO Bilotti,Palisades PD Doe Police Officers #1–10, and PalisadesPD Supervisor Doe Police Officers #1–10 (collectively, the“Officer Defendants”), the State of New Jersey, the PalisadesInterstate Parkway Commission (the “Commission”), andPalisades PD. Compl.; see also D.E. 35 (“MTD Opinion”)(explaining that the Court could only glean that Plaintiffintended to assert each claim against every defendant).*4 The Commission and Palisades PD moved to dismiss theclaims asserted against them, as did the Officer Defendantsto the extent those claims were asserted against them intheir official capacities. See D.E. 17. On January 11, 2023,the Court granted the motion and dismissed all claimsbrought against the Commission and Palisades PD, as well asthose brought against the Officer Defendants in their officialcapacities. MTD Opinion; D.E. 36.The Officer Defendants and the State of New Jerseysubsequently answered the Complaint on March 27, 2023.D.E. 45. The parties then stipulated to the dismissal of thefollowing claims against the following parties: (1) all claimsagainst the State of New Jersey, (2) Plaintiff's request forinjunctive relief against every defendant, (3) the false arrest(Count I) and false imprisonment (Count II) claims againstSergeant Kimbro, (4) the unreasonable and excessive force(Count III), malicious prosecution (Count IV), substantivedue process (Count VII), procedural due process (CountVIII), malicious abuse of process/malicious prosecution(Count X) claims against Sergeant Kimbro, PO Conboy, POWojcik, and PO Bilotti, (5) the failure to supervise (Count V)and failure to intervene (Count IX) claims against PO Levine,PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, and PO Bilotti, and (6) the Monellclaim (Count VI) against every defendant. D.E. 49.After the close of discovery, the Hon. Leda D. Wettregranted Defendants leave to file the instant Motion. D.E.79. Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment,along with supporting papers, on December 9, 2024. D.Es.90 & 91. Defendants also filed their reply to Plaintiff'sopposition that day. D.E. 92. Plaintiff filed his opposition toDefendants’ motion on December 10, 2024. D.E. 93. Afterthe Court ordered Defendants to re-file their briefs to complywith the page limits set forth in Local Civil Rule 7.2, D.E.94, Defendants requested a page limit extension for theirbriefs. D.E. 95. The Court granted Defendants’ request tofile overlength briefs. D.E. 96. Defendants subsequently fileda letter raising procedural deficiencies regarding Plaintiff'sfilings, D.E. 98, after which the Court administrativelyterminated D.E. 90 and ordered the parties to re-file theirsummary judgment papers by January 6, 2025, D.E. 99.On January 6, 2025, Defendants filed: (1) their Notice ofMotion, D.E. 100; (2) their Motion, D.E. 100-1; (3) theirSUF; (4) their proposed order on the Motion, D.E. 100-3;and (5) the First Afanador Cert., and exhibits thereto.9Defendants also filed: (1) their Reply; (2) their Response toPlaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement ofUndisputed Material Facts, D.E. 102-1 (“Defs. Resp. to Pl.SUF”)10; and (3) the Certification of Victor A. Afanador,Esq. in Further Support of Motion, D.E. 102-2 (“SecondAfanador Cert.”), and exhibits thereto. Two days after theCourt's January 6, 2025, filing deadline, Plaintiff then filed:(1) his Opposition; (2) Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF; (3) the IgbokweDecl., and (4) exhibits to the Igbokwe Decl., D.E. 104-3.III. LEGAL STANDARD*5 A court may grant summary judgment “if the movantshows that there is no genuine dispute as to any materialfact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if there is asufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury couldreturn a verdict for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty.
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Andersonv. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factualdispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the caseunder governing law. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).The movant bears the initial responsibility to establish thebasis for the motion for summary judgment and to identifythe portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of agenuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the non-moving party bears theburden of proof on an issue, the moving party's initial burdencan be met simply by “pointing out to the district court ...that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovingparty's case.” Id. at 325.After the moving party has met its initial burden, thenon-moving party must set forth specific facts showingthat there is a genuinely disputed factual issue fortrial by “citing to particular parts of materials in therecord, including depositions, documents, electronicallystored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, ...admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by“showing that the materials cited do not establish the absenceor presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving partyfails to rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient toestablish the existence of an element essential to that party'scase, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof attrial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.Under Rule 56, a court must view the evidence presentedin the light most favorable to the non-moving party. SeeAnderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion forsummary judgment,” Blair, 283 F.3d at 608, as are unswornstatements in memoranda and unsupported statements inpleadings, Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990).IV. ANALYSISThe Court reads Defendants’ Motion as seeking summaryjudgment on the remaining claims in this action broughtagainst them. While not clearly set forth in Defendants’Motion, the remaining claims against Defendants are asfollows: (1) Plaintiff's false arrest claim (Count I) againstPO Levine, PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, and PO Bilotti, (2)Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim (Count II) against POLevine, PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, and PO Bilotti, (3) Plaintiff'sunreasonable and excessive force claim (Count III) againstPO Levine, (4) Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim underSection 1983 (Count IV) against PO Levine, (5) Plaintiff'sfailure to supervise claim (Count V) against Sergeant Kimbro,(6) Plaintiff's substantive due process claim (Count VII)against PO Levine, (7) Plaintiff's procedural due processclaim (Count VIII) against PO Levine, (8) Plaintiff's failureto intervene claim (Count IX) against Sergeant Kimbro, (9)Plaintiff's state law malicious abuse of process claim (CountX) under the NJCRA against PO Levine, and (10) Plaintiff'sstate law malicious prosecution claim (Count X) under theNJCRA against PO Levine.11 See supra Section II; Compl.*6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds (1) thatPlaintiff has abandoned his excessive force, substantive dueprocess, and malicious abuse of process claims and (2) thatPlaintiff has not met his burden to make a factual showingsufficient to establish the lack of probable cause requiredfor Plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, maliciousprosecution, procedural due process, failure to supervise, andfailure to intervene claims to survive summary judgment.Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgmenton each of Plaintiff's remaining claims.The Court further concludes that the Unidentified OfficerDefendants should be dismissed from this action underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.A. Plaintiff Has Abandoned His Excessive Force,Substantive Due Process, and Malicious Abuse ofProcess ClaimsA plaintiff's “failure to respond to [a] defendant's argumentson summary judgment constitutes an abandonment of thesecauses of action ....” Greene v. Elizabeth Police Dep't, No.18-8972, 2023 WL 6233124, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2023)(citation modified) (quoting Brenner v. Twp. of Moorestown,No. 09-219, 2011 WL 1882394, *11 (D.N.J. May 17, 2011));CareOne at Birchwood, LLC v. Twp. of Edison, No. 22-7976,2024 WL 1298902, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2024) (findingthat plaintiffs had abandoned a Section 1983 claim whenthey did not respond to defendant's arguments regardingthe claim, and accordingly granting defendant's motion forsummary judgment on that claim); Bernard v. Webb-McRae,No. 17-7030, 2020 WL 1329934, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2020)(same).12Defendants argue that Plaintiff has abandoned his excessiveforce, substantive due process, and malicious abuse of processclaims. Reply at 12 n.4.13 The Court agrees.
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51. Excessive forceThe Court first finds that Plaintiff has abandoned hisexcessive force claim. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjectedto excessive force when PO Levine allegedly (1) placedPlaintiff in handcuffs that were too tight, (2) left Plaintiffin a hot patrol car for an extended period of time withoutventilation, and (3) left Plaintiff unrestrained by a seatbeltduring transport to the police station. See Compl. 76. InDefendants’ Motion, they argue, inter alia, that (1) Plaintiff'sbruising was insufficient to rise to the requisite level to beconsidered excessive force and that he did not commenton the handcuffs when he was PO Levine's vehicle, (2)the temperature on the day of the arrest did not leavePlaintiff exposed to unnecessary heat and that PO Levineaccommodated Plaintiff's request to open a window in POLevine's vehicle, and (3) that Plaintiff never told PO Levinethat Plaintiff's seatbelt was not properly secured and thatPO Levine complied with Plaintiff's request to slow downwhen driving. Mot. at 18–21. Defendants also argue that POLevine is entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff's claimsregarding his allegedly unsecured seatbelt and allegedly hotpatrol vehicle because there is no clearly established rightto a secure seatbelt or a temperature regulated car duringtransport. Id. at 35–37. Plaintiff's Opposition does not evenreference his excessive force claims, much less refute any ofDefendants’ legal arguments or any of the evidence producedby Defendants. See Opp. And the only time Plaintiff evenattempts to dispute a fact relevant to these claims—thatPlaintiff did not ask PO Levine to loosen his handcuffs—inhis materials opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff fails toshow that the fact is actually disputed. See supra n.7.*7 Because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently addressDefendants arguments with respect to his excessive forceclaim, Plaintiff has therefore “failed to meet [his] burdenof identifying specific facts showing a genuine issue asto” his excessive force claim. Campbell v. Jefferson Univ.Physicians, 22 F. Supp. 3d 478, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014). TheCourt will accordingly GRANT summary judgment in favorof PO Levine and against Plaintiff on Count III (excessiveforce).2. Substantive due processPlaintiff has also abandoned the claim he brought allegingthat his false arrest, false charges, and malicious prosecutionviolated his substantive due process rights under Section1983 and the Fifth Amendment. See Compl. ¶¶ 123–29.Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim is derived fromthe protection provided by the Fourth Amendment andtherefore must be brought under the Fourth Amendment, notthe Fifth Amendment. See Mot. at 23–24 (citing Mills v.Golden Nugget Atlantic City, LLC, No. 19-19610, 2021 WL3667076, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2021) (granting defendantsummary judgment on substantive due process claim relatingto false arrest brought under the Fourteenth Amendmentbecause plaintiff was required to bring it under the FourthAmendment)). Once again, Plaintiff failed to address hissubstantive due process claim at all in his Opposition,much less respond to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffcannot bring a substantive due process claim under theFifth Amendment, see Opp.—“thereby ‘leading the Court toconclude that he ha[s] abandoned’ the claim and ‘warrantingits dismissal.’ ” Greene, 2023 WL 6233124, at *5 (quotingWilliams v. Lenape Bd. of Educ., No. 17-7482, 2020 WL2111221, *19 (D.N.J. May 4, 2020)). The Court will thusGRANT summary judgment in favor of PO Levine andagainst Plaintiff on Count VII (substantive due process).3. Malicious abuse of processThe Court further finds that Plaintiff abandoned his maliciousabuse of process claim. As explained supra n.11, althoughPlaintiff has brought his state law malicious prosecution andmalicious abuse of process against PO Levine in a singlecount (Count X), the two claims have materially differentelements, and the Court therefore addresses them separately.With respect to malicious abuse of process, Plaintiff allegesthat his criminal prosecution was continued after PO Levineknew he had no probable cause for the arrest or initiationof the criminal prosecution. Compl. 150. Defendants arguein their Motion that this claim fails because Plaintiff hasnot adduced evidence that PO Levine performed further actsafter initiating judicial process, as required to state an abuseof process claim under New Jersey law. See Mot. at 27–28(citing Cresci v. Gyess, No. 17-2342, 2018 WL 4961466, at*9 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Cresci v. Gyss, 792F. App'x 226 (3d Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff failed to address thisargument or discuss his malicious abuse of process claim at allin his Opposition. See Opp. The Court will therefore GRANTsummary judgment in favor of PO Levine and against Plaintiffon the malicious abuse of process claim set forth as partof Count X. See, e.g., Greene, 2023 WL 6233124, at *6(dismissing abuse of process claim at summary judgment onsimilar grounds).
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6B. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgmenton Plaintiff's False Arrest, False Imprisonment,Malicious Prosecution, Procedural Due Process,Failure to Supervise, and Failure to Intervene Claims*8 Plaintiff has also brought false arrest, false imprisonment,malicious prosecution, procedural due process, failure tosupervise, and failure to intervene claims under Section1983, as well as a malicious prosecution claim under NewJersey law. See Compl. As explained below, for theseclaims to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must show—at minimum—that there is a genuine dispute as to whetherhis arrest for impersonating a police officer was supported byprobable cause. Because Plaintiff stipulated to probable causefor his arrest while pleading guilty the Failure to Keep RightTicket, however, he is unable to make that showing. The Courtwill therefore grant Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff's falsearrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, proceduraldue process, failure to supervise, and failure to interveneclaims.1. Plaintiff has stipulated to probable cause for his arrestDefendants argue that Plaintiff stipulated to probable causefor his arrest at the time of his plea by failing to respond totheir RFAs establishing that Plaintiff stipulated to probablecause. Mot. at 14; Reply at 1–3. While the Court is loathe toresolve the critical issue of the existence of probable cause onthe basis that Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ RFAs,the Court agrees with Defendants that it is appropriate to doso here.Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, “[a] party mayserve on any other party a written request to admit ... the truthof ... matters ... relating to ... facts, the application of lawto fact, or opinions about either” and “[a] matter is admittedunless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whomthe request is directed serves on the requesting party a writtenanswer or objection address to the matter....” And, as the ThirdCircuit has explained:Matters deemed admitted due to aparty's failure to respond to requestsfor admission are “conclusivelyestablished” under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 36(b), and maysupport a summary judgment motion.Rule 36(b) is intended to narrow thetriable issues in the case. An admissionis therefore an “unassailable statementof fact” and is binding on the non-responsive party unless withdrawn oramended.Sec'y United States Dep't of Lab. v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, 91(3d Cir. 2017).Here, Defendants served the RFAs on Plaintiff on March 15,2024. Defs. SUF 41. Plaintiff never responded to the RFAs.Id. There is no evidence that Plaintiff ever sought an extensionof time to respond. The first—and only—time Plaintiff makesany reference to the existence of these RFAs is in his Responseto Defendants’ SUF, where he asserts that Defendants servedthe RFAs after the Hon. Leda D. Wettre closed discovery andtherefore that Defendants were not entitled to responses. Pl.Resp. to Defs. SUF ¶¶ 40–41. But Plaintiff is mistaken thatrequests for admission may not be served or responded toafter the close of discovery. As the Third Circuit advised inaffirming a district court's decision to deem admitted requestsfor admission for which the responses were due after the closeof discovery, “[n]othing in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure36] provides that a party may ignore requests if the responsesare due after the close of discovery.” Shelton v. Fast AdvanceFunding, LLC, 805 F. App'x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2020). TheThird Circuit has further explained—in a precedential opinion—that:*9 requests for admission typicallycome late in discovery, or even afterdiscovery has been completed and trialis imminent. If at that point a party isserved with a request for admission ofa fact that it now knows to be true,it must admit that fact, even if thatadmission will gut its case and subjectit to summary judgment. That is whatRule 36 was intended to do—narrowthe issues for trial, or even altogetherobviate the need for trial.Longer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786, 803 (3d Cir.1992).Plaintiff does not even attempt to rebut the caselawdemonstrating that “requests for admission are distinct from
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7other discovery devices, and that a party can still be obligedto respond to a request for admission even after the close ofdiscovery,” Shelton, 805 F. App'x at 158. In fact, Plaintiffdoes not mention this issue at all in his Opposition, despiteDefendants arguing in their Motion that the RFAs related toprobable cause should be deemed admitted and that deemingthose admitted would be fatal to Plaintiff's case. See Mot. at14. Because Plaintiff has failed to brief this issue, Plaintiff hasalso failed to point to any particular features of this case thatmilitate departing from the general rule that post-discoveryrequests for admission require responses. Indeed, whilePlaintiff cites D.E. 61—the Hon. Leda D. Wettre's AmendedScheduling Order providing that fact discovery would beclosed on January 30, 2024—when asserting in his Responseto Defendants’ SUF that the RFAs were served after the closeof fact discovery, a review of D.E. 29—the initial schedulingorder in the case, which sets forth more specific discoverydeadliness—demonstrates that requests for admission werenot considered part of fact discovery in this case. While D.E.29 provides specific deadlines for interrogatories, requestsfor production of documents, and depositions, it does notmention requests for admission, much less provide deadlinesfor such requests.14 Accordingly, because there are no case-specific factors that warrant departing from the rule thatpost-discovery requests for admission require responses andbecause Plaintiff never responded to the RFAs, the Courtdeems Defendants’ RFAs admitted under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 36 due to Plaintiff's failure to respond to theRFAs.And, despite many opportunities to do so, Plaintiff has nevereven raised the possibility of withdrawing the admitted RFAs.Plaintiff's failure to properly address the RFAs has tied theCourt's hands. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36expressly allows “the court, on motion, [to] permit[ ] theadmission to be withdrawn or amended,” the Third Circuit hasheld that “a district court errs when it withdraws admissionswithout any prompting by the parties.” Percella v. City ofBayonne, No. 21-1504, 2022 WL 2207832, at *2 (3d Cir.June 21, 2022) (citing Goodson v. Brennan, 688 F. App'x 372,375 (6th Cir. 2017) and Am. Auto. Ass'n (Inc.) v. AAA LegalClinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5thCir. 1991)). In Percella, the Third Circuit was neverthelesscareful to explain that “[w]hile Rule 36 does not authorize adistrict court to unilaterally withdraw or amend an admission,it does not specify the precise form a motion to withdrawor amend must take.” 2022 WL 2207832, at *2. Districtcourts following the Third Circuit's guidance in Percellahave accordingly considered requests to withdraw admissionssufficient to constitute a “motion” under Rule 36 where:(1) a party explicitly requested “withdrawal of the deemedadmissions” in its opposition to summary judgment, Owensv. IQ Data Int'l, Inc., No. 20-4099, 2022 WL 4225391, at*1 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2022) (quoting party's brief); (2)upon receipt of its opponent's motion for summary judgmentusing the party's failure to respond to requests for admission,the party served its responses to the requests for admissionand filed a motion for extension of time to do so, K.K.-M. v. New Jersey Dep't of Educ., No. 17-11579, 2023 WL4551640, at *1 (D.N.J. July 14, 2023); and (3) a plaintiffexplicitly stated in his response to a statement of material factthat, “[t]o the extent any Request for Admissions are deemedadmitted, Plaintiff asks the Court to withdraw or amendthe admissions” and analyzed the factors courts consider onmotions to withdraw admissions, Powers v. Se. PennsylvaniaTransportation Auth., No. 19-4685, D.E. 68-1 60 (E.D. Pa.June 25, 2022), and then the opposing parties “responded insubstance to [the] request in their reply brief,” Powers, 2023WL 3569964, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2023).*10 Here, Plaintiff has not taken any action that couldpossibly be construed as a request for the admissions in theRFAs to be withdrawn, much less a request sufficient toconstitute a “motion” under Rule 36. As explained supra,the first—and only—time Plaintiff made any reference to theexistence of these RFAs was in his Response to Defendants’SUF, where he asserted that Defendants served the RFAsafter the Hon. Leda D. Wettre closed discovery and thereforethat Defendants were not entitled to responses. Pl. Resp.to Defs. SUF ¶¶ 40–41. Plaintiff did not even, in thealternative, request in his Response to Defendants’ SUF thatthe RFAs be withdrawn, as the plaintiff did in Powers, seeNo. 19-4685, D.E. 68-1 60. Nor did Plaintiff address atall in his Opposition Defendants’ argument in their Motionthat the RFAs related to probable cause should be deemedadmitted and that deeming those admitted would be fatal toDefendants’ case. See Mot. at 14. Moreover, Plaintiff failedto take any action whatsoever with respect to the RFAsafter Defendants devoted a page-and-a-half of its fifteen-page Reply to further arguing that the Court should deem theRFAs admitted and providing caselaw explaining that post-discovery requests for admission require responses. See Dkt.;Reply at 1–3. Placed on notice that RFAs deemed admittedcould be fatal to many of his claims and faced with severalopportunities and avenues to move for their withdrawal—orbegin the process of doing so—in the eight months since thefiling of Defendants’ Motion and Reply (e.g., filing a formalmotion to withdraw upon receipt of Defendants’ Motion,
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8making an explicit withdrawal request in his Opposition,making an explicit withdrawal request in his Response toDefendants’ SUF, filing a formal motion to withdraw uponreceipt of Defendants’ Reply—or anytime thereafter, servingresponses to the RFAs on Plaintiff and requesting an extensionof time to respond, requesting a conference to discuss theissue, filing a letter to the Court, etc.), Plaintiff did nothing.Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not movedto withdraw the admission of the RFAs. And, because theCourt is not permitted to sua sponte withdraw the admissionof the RFAs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, theCourt further concludes that the admissions have not beenwithdrawn.So, the Court must treat the admissions as “an unassailablestatement of fact that narrows the triable issues in the case”and “not merely another layer of evidence, upon whichthe ... [C]ourt can superimpose its own assessment of weightand validity.” Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. Div. of the BOCGrp., Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund ofPhiladelphia & Vicinity, 850 F.2d 1028, 1036–37 (3d Cir.1988). The admitted RFAs on which the Court relies inthis Opinion are described in further detail supra SectionI.B, but the most critical admitted fact is that as part of anOctober 20, 2020, plea agreement resolving Plaintiff's Failureto Keep Right Ticket, Safety Gass Requirement Ticket,and Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons, Plaintiffstipulated before the municipal court to probable cause withrespect to the Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons.RFAs No. 10–13.2. Plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, maliciousprosecution, procedural due process, failure to supervise,and failure to intervene claims all fail because he cannotshow that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest himPlaintiff's stipulation to probable cause with respect tothe Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons is fatal tohis false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,procedural due process, failure to supervise, and failureto intervene claims. Defendants are therefore entitled tosummary judgment on each of those claims.a. False arrest, false imprisonment and maliciousprosecutionAs Plaintiff concedes, his false arrest, false imprisonment,and malicious prosecution claims all require that he provethat Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him forimpersonating a police officer. See Opp. at 5; Harvard v.Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (“False arrest andfalse imprisonment claims will necessarily fail if probablecause existed for any one of the crimes charged against thearrestee.”) (citation modified); Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318F.3d 497, 522 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]here was probable cause forarrest. Because initiation of the proceeding without probablecause is an essential element of a malicious prosecutionclaim, summary judgment in favor of the defendants wasappropriate on this claim.”); Carson v. Aurand, 837 F. App'x121, 123 (3d Cir. 2020) (“To make a claim for maliciousprosecution under both federal and [New Jersey] state law,[the plaintiff] must show, among other things, that [the policedetective defendant] initiated the proceeding against himwithout probable cause.”) (citing Allen v. N.J. State Police,974 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2020) (federal law) and Merklev. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000)(state law)).Defendants have established that there was probable cause toarrest and charge Plaintiff for impersonating a police officerbased on Plaintiff's stipulation to probable cause with respectto the Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons.15 Assuch, Plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute as to probablecause—an essential element of his false arrest, falseimprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims—and thoseclaims must therefore fail as a matter of law. See Meleikav. City of Jersey City, No. 17-1959, 2018 WL 4522046,at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2018) (“[M]alicious prosecutionrequires lack of probable cause; the defendant stipulatedon the record that there was probable cause; a maliciousprosecution claim therefore cannot be maintained.”); Ramonv. Stone, No. 18-1640, 2023 WL 3092189, at *5 (D.N.J.Apr. 26, 2023) (finding that no genuine dispute of materialfact existed as to false arrest claim where plaintiff hadstipulated to probable cause in municipal court throughhis attorney); Browner v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., No.A-3232-08T1, 2010 WL 3258263, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.Div. Aug. 19, 2010) (holding that, due to a stipulation ofprobable cause, “there was no ‘absence of probable cause’to prosecute” and accordingly affirming trial court's orderdismissing state law malicious prosecution claim); Jenkinsv. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, No. 17-151, 2018WL 345119, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2018) (“[A] stipulationof probable cause in an underlying criminal proceedingbars subsequent claims for unlawful search, false arrest,false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution [under §1983].” (citation modified)).16
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*11 The Court will therefore GRANT summary judgmentin favor of PO Levine, PO Conboy, PO Wojcik, and PO Bilottiand against Plaintiff on Count I (false arrest) and Count II(false imprisonment). The Court will also GRANT summaryjudgment in favor of PO Levine and against Plaintiff on CountIV (malicious prosecution under Section 1983) and on thestate law malicious prosecution claim set forth as part ofCount X.17b. Procedural due processPlaintiff alleges that his procedural due process rights arisingunder the United States Constitution and the New JerseyConstitution were violated because (1) he was arrested andprosecuted without a warrant and without probable cause, and(2) even if there were probable cause, a warrantless arrest andcontinued prosecution of Plaintiff were improper. Compl. 131. Both his federal and state constitutional claims fail.As explained supra n.13, while Defendants are correctthat Plaintiff's federal procedural due process claim wasimproperly brought under the Fifth Amendment—whichdoes not apply to state officials, Bergdoll v. City of York,515 F. App'x 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Nguyen v.U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 983))—the Court will construe it as though brought under theFourteenth Amendment. Construing the claim as thoughbrought under the Fourteenth Amendment does not saveit from dismissal, however. The Court finds that Plaintiff'sprocedural due process claim brought under Section 1983,like his substantive due process claim, is “more properlyanalyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than proceduraldue process.” Posey v. Swissvale Borough, No. 12-955, 2013WL 989953, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013). While the ThirdCircuit has not specifically addressed whether proceduraldue process claims like Plaintiff's—rather than substantivedue process claims—are barred by the rule “that whengovernment behavior is governed by a specific constitutionalamendment, due process analysis is inappropriate,” Berg v.County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000),numerous other courts in this Circuit have applied this ruleto dismiss procedural due process claims based on falsearrest and/or malicious prosecution claims. See, e.g., Posey,2013 WL 989953, at *15 (analyzing plaintiff's claim “thathe was arrested without probable cause, and that the policedid not conduct a sufficient investigation before charginghim” under the Fourth Amendment and dismissing becauseit had already found that there was probable cause to initiatecriminal proceedings against him); Swedron v. Borough, No.08-1095, 2008 WL 5051399, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008)(“[A]s ‘the gravamen’ of his lawsuit is so clearly premisedon a ... Fourth Amendment violation based upon his allegedmalicious prosecution and arrest without probable cause,the Court will dismiss the procedural due process claimalong with the substantive due process claim.”); Crouse v. S.Lebanon Twp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (“Aprocedural due process claim is ... an inappropriate vehicle bywhich to seek vindication for a purportedly unlawful arrest.”).Moreover, the Third Circuit has explained that “while somefalse arrest claims might be subject to a [procedural] dueprocess analysis,” “the constitutionality of arrests by stateofficials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather thandue process analysis.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 269.*12 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's federalprocedural due process claim is subsumed by the FourthAmendment false arrest, false imprisonment, and maliciousprosecution claims the Court has dismissed for failure toestablish lack of probable cause and because “Plaintiff hasarticulated no basis for a procedural due process claimseparate and apart from those actions underlying his FourthAmendment claims,” Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345,366 (M.D. Pa. 2013), summary judgment for Defendants iswarranted on Plaintiff's federal procedural due process claim.Summary judgment for Defendants is also warranted onPlaintiff's procedural due process claim brought under theNJCRA for deprivation of his rights secured by the NewJersey Constitution because “Section 1983 provides remediesfor the deprivation of both procedural and substantive rightswhile [the NJCRA] provides remedies only for the violationof substantive rights.” Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 477(2014) (emphasis added).Accordingly, the Court will GRANT summary judgmentin favor of PO Levine and against Plaintiff on Count VIII(procedural due process).c. Failure to supervise and failure to interveneBecause Plaintiff has not established an underlyingconstitutional violation, see supra Section IV.A–B.2.b,Plaintiff's failure to supervise and failure to intervene claimsmust also fail as a matter of law. See White v. City ofVineland, 500 F. Supp. 3d 295, 305–06 (D.N.J. 2020) (“Tobe liable under a failure to intervene theory, the plaintiffmust have demonstrated that his underlying constitutionalrights were violated, that the officer had a duty to intervene,and that the officer must have had a realistic and reasonable
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10opportunity to intervene.” (emphasis added) (citing Smith v.Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2002)); Ramon,2023 WL 3092189, at *9 (granting summary judgment todefendants after finding “no genuine issue of material factas to whether the named officers failed to intervene” whereplaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material factas to the underlying constitutional violation); Coleman v. Cityof Long Branch, No. 15-7314, 2018 WL 4027033, at *10(D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2018) (summary judgment for defendants onfailure to supervise claim was appropriate because the court“ha[d] already found that there [was] insufficient evidenceto find that [plaintiff's] underlying constitutional rights wereviolated, [so] supervisory liability c[ould not] be imposedagainst either the [c]ity or any of the named officers fortheir role in the same.”). The Court will therefore GRANTsummary judgment in favor of Sergeant Kimbro and againstPlaintiff on Count V (failure to supervise) and Count IX(failure to intervene).C. The Court Will Dismiss the UnidentifiedDefendantsThe Court will also dismiss the Unidentified Defendantsfrom this matter. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure21, “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time,on just terms, add or drop a party.” A plaintiff may useJohn Doe defendants “until reasonable discovery permits thetrue defendants to be identified.” Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty.,336 F. App'x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009). But “[i]f reasonablediscovery does not unveil the proper identities, ... the JohnDoe defendants must be dismissed.” Id. Here, “discovery wascommenced over three years ago, see D.E. [22], and Plaintiffstill has not identified the fictitious defendants or providedevidence as to how they were involved in this matter.” Milesv. City of Jersey City, No. 14-5492, 2018 WL 4005742, at*10 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2018); see Adams v. City of Camden,461 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (D.N.J. 2006) (“After a year ofdiscovery and motion practice, Plaintiff has failed to identifythese defendants or provide any evidence of their liability forthe claims raised in the Complaint.”); see also Blakeslee, 336F. App'x at 250 (affirming dismissal of fictitious defendantsunder Rule 21 where plaintiff “had approximately ten monthsof discovery to allow her to identify the individual JohnDoe defendants”). Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS theUnidentified Defendants from this action with prejudice.V. INACCURACIES IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF*13 Having concluded its discussion of the merits ofPlaintiff's case and Defendants’ Motion, the Court mustnow, regrettably, go on to address some concerns withPlaintiff's Opposition. In reviewing Plaintiff's Opposition,the Court independently identified multiple inaccuratequotations and citations.18 While these inaccuracies varyin severity, they appear in nearly half of the pages ofPlaintiff's Opposition. And, when considered together, theseinaccuracies give rise to concerns that the brief was preparedwithout adequate diligence—and possibly using generativeartificial intelligence (“GAI”) without proper verification—in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Section I.Bof the undersigned's judicial preferences, and the New JerseyRules of Professional Conduct (“NJRPC”).A sampling of the inaccuracies in Plaintiff's Opposition is setforth below, each organized under the heading of the propercase citation:• Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345 (3dCir. 2003): Plaintiff writes, “However, it is by no meansapparent as a matter of law that this conversation alonedemonstrated a ‘substantial chance of criminal activityon the [Plaintiff's] part.’ Camiolo. 334 F.3d at 363.” Opp.at 23 (emphasis added). But the language Plaintiff quotesdoes not appear in Camiolo, a precedential (and binding)Third Circuit case. Instead, the quoted language, alongwith the rest of the sentence after the word “However,”appears verbatim in a non-binding case from this Districtthat Plaintiff cites elsewhere in his brief: Frohner v.City of Wildwood, No. 07-1174, 2008 WL 5102460, at*7 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2008). Frohner, in turn, states, “itis by no means apparent as a matter of law that thisconversation alone demonstrated a ‘substantial chanceof criminal activity on the suspect's part.’ Mounts, 248F.3d at 715 ....” Id. (emphasis added). United States v.Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001) is an out-of-circuit case that is itself elsewhere cited in Plaintiff'sOpposition. In short, it appears that Plaintiff has takena sentence from a non-binding District of New Jerseycase quoting a similarly non-binding Seventh Circuitcase and attributed the quoted material from that non-binding Seventh Circuit case to a binding Third Circuitcase (and failed to quote, or cite at all, the rest of thematerial coming directly from the non-biding District ofNew Jersey case).• Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2005): Plaintiffwrites, “... ‘whether there was any reasonable basis tosuppose there was probable cause,’ which precludes theentry of summary judgment on this record. Gilles, 427F.3d at 205.” Opp. at 23 (emphasis added). While this
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11time the language Plaintiff attributes to the binding ThirdCircuit case, Gilles, does appear in that case, it appearsonly in a parenthetical to a “see also” cite to a SeventhCircuit case: “... see also Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (‘whether there was anyreasonable basis to suppose there was probable cause ...is the test for qualified immunity’).” Gilles, 427 F.3d at205 (emphasis added). Plaintiff fails to even include aparenthetical noting that the citation to Gilles had beenmodified in any respect, must less note that the quotedlanguage it attributes to the Third Circuit Gilles is in facta quotation from a Seventh Circuit case the Third Circuitincluded in a parenthetical.*14 • Manitta v. New Jersey, No. 13-420, 2014WL 6908459 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2014): Plaintiff writes,“Similarly, in Manitta v. New Jersey, the plaintiffspecifically stipulated to probable cause during theplea hearing. Manitta v. N.J., No. 15-2870, 2016 WL609476. at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2016).” Opp. at 19(emphases added). While this case does exist andPlaintiff's assertion about the probable cause stipulationis factually correct, the case number, Westlaw citation,and date of decision are all completely inaccurate. Thecorrect case number is 13-420. not 15-2870: the correctWestlaw citation is 2014 WL 6908459. not 2016 WL609476: and the correct date of decision is Dec. 8, 2014,not Feb. 16.2016—in fact, the case was closed in 2014.• Piazza v. Lakkis, No. 11-2130, 2012 WL 2007112 (M.D.Pa. June 5, 2012): Plaintiff writes, “The judgmentmust indicate the plaintiff's innocence of the allegedmisconduct underlying the offenses charged.... Piazzav. Lakkis, No. 3:11-cv-2130, 2012 WL 2042671, at *31(M.D. Pa. June 5, 2012).” Opp. at 16 (emphases added).While this case does exist and stands for the propositionfor which Plaintiff cites it, Plaintiff completely misstatesthe Westlaw citation and the page number. The correctWestlaw citation is 2012 WL 2007112 and the Westlawcitation Plaintiff includes does not exist. Moreover, thematerial supporting the proposition for which Plaintiffcites the case appears not on page 31, but on pages 9–10.In fact, the page cited by Plaintiff does not exist becausethe opinion is only 13 pages.• Ianuale v. Keyport Twp., No. 15-8256, 2016 WL 5955527(D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2016): Plaintiff writes, “In Ianualev. Keyport Twp., the plea agreement included explicithandwritten amendments acknowledging probablecause and waiving civil action. Ianuale v. Keyport Twp.,No. 15-8256, 2016 WL 6043804, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct.13, 2016).” Opp. at 18–19 (emphases added). Whilethis case does exist and stands for the proposition forwhich Plaintiff cites it, Plaintiff completely misstatesthe Westlaw citation and the page number. The correctWestlaw citation is 2016 WL 5955527 and the Westlawcitation Plaintiff includes does not exist. Moreover, thematerial supporting the proposition for which Plaintiffcites the case appears not on page 8, but on page 3.• State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010):Plaintiff writes, “In fact the Model Code Commentaries,makes clear the ‘official authority’ referenced in thestatute is not ‘the power of law enforcement officersto make arrests, to seize, and to search.’ See State v.Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256, 176 (N.J. 2010).” Opp. at 10.The first issue with this citation is that Plaintiff cites toone reporter and then uses the page number from anotherreporter for a pincite. This issue, though it makes it moredifficult for the Court to identify the relevant material(and being something that Plaintiff does numerous timesin his brief), is not a major cause for concern. Theprimary issue is that Gandhi does not in fact discuss thestatute Plaintiff is interpreting. Instead, Gandhi standsfor the general proposition that a court should first lookto the plain language of a statute in construing thatstatute. See 201 N.J. at 176. It is therefore misleadingfor Plaintiff to cite Gandhi without further explainingthat Gandhi supports the specific proposition regardinga specific statute for which Plaintiff cites the case notbecause it interprets that specific statute, but—rather—only because it explains a general canon of statutoryinterpretation.*15 This Court is not generally in the business ofquibbling with a party's citations, but the nature andpervasiveness of these inaccuracies—misstatements of thecases in which quotations appear, Westlaw citations, decisiondates, docket numbers, pincites, and legal holdings—haveforced the Court's hand. These cumulative inaccuracies raisea significant concern that the brief was not properly reviewedfor accuracy and may have been prepared using GAI withoutproper review, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure11, the undersigned's judicial preferences, and the NJRPC.Accordingly, as detailed in the Order accompanying thisOpinion, the Court will ORDER Plaintiff's counsel—O.Williams Igbokwe, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice to this Court)and Dean Maglione, Esq. (local counsel)19—TO SHOWCAUSE why the conduct described herein has not violated
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Section I.B of theundersigned's judicial preferences regarding the use of GAI,and the NJRPC.VI. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANTDefendants’ Motion for summary judgment and DISMISSthe Unidentified Defendants from this action with prejudice.An appropriate Order follows.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2731460Footnotes1For ease of reference, the Court refers to D.E. 100-1, Defendants’ brief in support of its motion for summaryjudgment, as “Motion” or “Mot.” As explained in Section II, infra, the notice of Motion is at D.E. 100.2The facts in this Section, and throughout this Opinion, are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.3The Court adopts the language used by Plaintiff himself to reference the physical condition of Plaintiff's lefthand.4In D.E. 104-1 (“Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF”), Plaintiff disputes that Plaintiff was in the left lane when PO Levinepulled out behind him and that PO Levine pulled Plaintiff over for failure to keep right on the basis that Ex.A to Igbokwe Decl.—PO Levine's dashcam video—“shows Plaintiff's vehicle in the right lane prior to beingpulled over.” Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF ¶¶ 3–4. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him,Plaintiff has not adequately disputed these facts. As Defendants point out in their Reply, the fact that Ex. Ashows that Plaintiff's vehicle was in the right lane prior to being pulled over shows only that at one point intime Plaintiff's vehicle was in the right lane, which is not sufficient to dispute PO Levine's sworn testimonythat Plaintiff's vehicle was in fact in the left lane long enough to warrant stopping Plaintiff for failure to keepright. See Reply at 3–4. Moreover, Plaintiff himself testified that he was traveling in the left lane when henoticed PO Levine behind him. Plaintiff Dep. at 51:16–25. While the Court finds that Plaintiff's use of Ex. Adoes not create a dispute of material fact in this instance, the Court declines to exclude Ex. A as Defendantsalso request. Although Defendants argue that Ex. A does not appear to be the version of the dashcam videoproduced in discovery, id. at 3 n.1, they have not actually objected that Ex. A “cannot be presented in a formthat would be admissible in evidence” at trial as required for exclusion at this stage of the proceedings. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee's Note to 2010 Amendment (cited by Third Circuit in Fraternal Ord. ofPolice, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016) in reversing district court's exclusion ofevidence at summary judgment). Accordingly, the Court will consider Ex. A in determining whether Plaintiff'scase survives summary judgment.5As explained infra Section IV, none of these disputes are material.6The parties dispute whether PO Levine conducted the stop with or without knowledge of Plaintiff's deformity.Compare Levine Dep. at 102:3–18 (testimony from PO Levine that he did not notice Plaintiff's deformityprior to Plaintiff's arrest), with Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF 5 (countering that Plaintiff testified to grabbing hiscredentials from the passenger seat of his vehicle to remove his driver's license, see Plaintiff Dep. at 55:13–54:20, which would have required the use of his hands and “most likely would have been observed by OfficerLevine”). Because the Court finds that probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest, see infra Section IV.B,
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13and Plaintiff does not dispute that probable cause for the stop existed, this dispute is not material. The Courthas nevertheless included this discussion for context.7Plaintiff attempts to dispute that the footage shows that Plaintiff never requested that PO Levine loosen thehandcuffs, citing “Exhibit B, Levine Video, 11:27:45–55.” Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUF 25. Neither Plaintiff norDefendants submitted the dashcam footage from PO Levine as Ex. B, but the Court assumes Plaintiff isreferencing the dashcam footage from PO Levine he submitted as Ex. A to Igbokwe Decl. The time rangePlaintiff references, however, does not show that Plaintiff made such a request—nor does any other portionof the dashcam footage from PO Levine. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not raised a dispute withrespect to this fact.8For the reasons stated infra Section IV.B.2, the Court has deemed the RFAs admitted.9Defendants also filed a motion to seal portions of Exs. B, C, and E and the entirety of Exs. F–J, M, andO to the First Afanador Decl. D.E. 97 (“Motion to Seal”). The Hon. Leda D. Wettre granted the Motion toSeal on February 5, 2025, ordering Defendants to file public redacted versions of all summary judgmentexhibits within fourteen days. D.E. 107. Defendants have failed to do so. As detailed in the accompanyingOrder, Defendants must file these public redacted versions within fourteen days of this Opinion and Order.The Court also notes that because the parties have not filed under seal their briefs revealing much of thecontent of the sealed exhibits, the Court will not seal this Opinion. Any party may, however, move to sealthis Opinion as appropriate.10Plaintiff did not file a statement of material facts in “a separate document (not part of a brief)” “in separatelynumbered paragraphs” as Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires if the opponent of summary judgment wishes “tosubstantiate the factual basis for opposition.” Instead, Plaintiff lists facts in a “Statement of Facts” in itsOpposition brief, without numbered paragraphs. See Opp. at 2–4. While Plaintiff's failure to properly submita statement of material facts is sufficient basis for the Court to find that Plaintiff has not submitted any ofits own facts in opposition to the Motion, the Court has nevertheless followed Defendants’ lead in treatingPlaintiff's “Statement of Facts” in its Opposition as Plaintiff's statement of material facts, see Defs. Resp. toPl. SUF. Moreover, Defendants don't have their hands clean with respect to the statements of material facts,either. Local Civil Rule 56.1 does not permit a summary judgment movant to submit an additional affirmativestatement of material facts with its response to the opponent's statement of material facts and its Reply, asDefendants did, see D.E. 102-1 at 10–13. See Anyclo Int'l Inc. v. Cha, No. 18-5759, 2021 WL 2110338, at *2(D.N.J. May 25, 2021) (“Here, Plaintiff submitted a supplemental statement of undisputed material facts in itsreply brief. Because that supplemental statement was included in a reply rather than an opposition brief, therewas no opportunity for Defendant to respond, as required by Rule 56.1(a).”). The Court therefore declines toconsider “Defendants’ Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” (D.E. 102-1 at 10–13).11The Court agrees with Defendants that, while Plaintiff has brought a joint claim for “malicious abuse ofprocess/malicious prosecution” (Count X), see Compl. ¶¶ 139–157, whether Defendants maliciously abusedprocess and whether Defendants maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff must be analyzed separately as they aretwo different torts. See Mot. at 26 (citing Garcia v. Lilleston, No. A-2955-13T1, 2015 WL 2458018, at *2 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. May 28, 2015)).12See also Player v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 240 F. App'x 513, 522 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the districtcourt had properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and rejecting plaintiffs’ argument thatthe district court had not considered a particular claim after finding that plaintiffs did not mention the claim inresponse to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment).13Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has abandoned his procedural due process claim brought under the FifthAmendment. Id. While it is true that Plaintiff did not specifically discuss this claim in his Opposition nor address
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14Defendants’ (correct) argument that the claim must be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment ratherthan the Fifth, Defendants nevertheless analyzed the claim as if it had been brought under the FourteenthAmendment in their Motion and the claim involves the probable cause issue addressed extensively by Plaintiffin his Opposition. See Mot. at 24–25; see generally Opp. Accordingly, the Court declines to find that Plaintiffhas abandoned his procedural due process claim and considers it alongside the other probable cause-relatedclaims, infra Section IV.B. See Long v. Bristol Twp., No. 10-1069, 2012 WL 2864410, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Pa.July 11, 2012) (finding at summary judgment that it was possible to infer that plaintiffs intended to basetheir procedural due process claims brought under the Fifth Amendment on the Fourteenth Amendment andtherefore analyzing those claims as though they had been brought under the Fourteenth Amendment).14None of the other amended scheduling orders in this case mention requests for admission, either. See D.E.s33, 39, 50, 53.15The Court notes that the RFA regarding probable cause that the Court has deemed admitted simplyreads: “On October 20, 2020, you stipulated to probable cause with respect to Complaint – Summons0288-S-2020-000056 before the municipal court.” RFA No. 13. The RFA therefore does not specificallyreference the Revised Impersonation Complaint-Summons signed by the municipal court judge where theImpersonating a Police Officer in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-8B charge was listed as the “OriginalCharge” and Impersonating a Public Servant in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-8A was listed as the“Amended Charge.” Because the RFA as admitted references encompasses both the Initial and RevisedImpersonation Complaint-Summons, the Court must find that Plaintiff has stipulated to probable cause as toboth the original charge (Impersonating a Police Officer) and the amended charge (Impersonating a PublicServant). In any event, however, even if Plaintiff had only stipulated to probable cause as to the Impersonatinga Public Servant charge, the Court finds that said stipulation would bar his false arrest and false imprisonmentclaims. Cf. Ferry v. Barry, No. 12-9, 2012 WL 4339454, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2012) (“Here, Plaintiff's guiltyplea to the amended charge under Winslow Township's loitering ordinance—which arose out of the eventsat his home on July 30, 2010 and the initial charge of obstructing administration of law—directly contradictsPlaintiff's assertion that no probable cause existed for his arrest.”).16Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's stipulation to probable cause bars his false arrest, false imprisonment,and malicious prosecution claims, it need not address Defendants’ argument that, due to Plaintiff's guilty pleato the Failure to Keep Right Ticket, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) also bars those claims. See Mot.at 5–6. The Court, however, notes that it is unclear: (1) whether Plaintiff's guilty plea to a municipal trafficoffense could even give rise to a Heck bar because Heck applies to criminal convictions, see Knox v. Cityof Royal Oak, No. 06-10428, 2006 WL 3825069, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2006); Vickey v. Nessler, 230N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 1989) (explaining that cases involving traffic offenses are not criminal cases);and (2) if Heck were to apply, whether a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his claims based on his arrest forimpersonating a police officer would in fact imply the invalidity of his conviction for failure to keep right asrequired for Heck to bar Plaintiff's claims, see Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2019)(finding that Heck did not act as a bar because the offense for which plaintiff pled guilty did not “derive[ ] froma common nucleus of operative fact with the offense underlying his § 1983 claim”).17For the avoidance of doubt, by granting summary judgment in favor of PO Levine on the malicious prosecutionclaim set forth as part of Count X as well as on the malicious abuse of process claim set forth as a part of CountX, see supra IV.A.3, the Court is granting summary judgment in favor of PO Levine on Count X in its entirety.18The Court does not fault Defendants for failing to highlight these issues in their Reply. The Court first becameaware of a major inaccuracy in Plaintiff's Opposition when attempting to review a case using one of thefalse Westlaw citations from Plaintiff's Opposition. As Defendants use Lexis—rather than Westlaw—citations
ALEXANDER SHAPOROV, Plaintiff, v. PIPPD P.O. MATTHEW..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.15throughout their briefing, see, e.g., Reply at 7, they likely did not have occasion to spot the false Westlawcitations that lead this Court to closely scrutinize each of Plaintiff's citations.19The Court notes that Plaintiff's Opposition is signed only by Mr. Igbokwe, Opp. at 27, in violation of LocalCivil Rule 11.1, which requires “that the attorney of record who is a member of the bar of this Court shallsign all papers submitted to the Court or filed with the Clerk.” The brief was, however, filed by Mr. Maglione,see Dkt., who—along with Mr. Maglione's law firm—“agree[d] to be held responsible for Mr. Igbokwe,” D.E.32-1. In any event, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) imposes obligations on filers of briefs as well assignatories thereto.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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