(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; ...
28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 (West 1966 & West Supp.1992).
The only provision in Title VII relating to costs is 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), which allows the court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Section 2000e-5(k) does not alter the standard by which the court awards costs that are not attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 54(d).
Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party, but allows denial of reasonable costs at the discretion of the court.
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 786 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir.1986). The non-prevailing party may overcome this presumption by establishing the existence of circumstances whereby a denial of costs to the prevailing party would be a proper exercise of discretion.
Id. at 732;
Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 269 F.2d 142, 146 (6th Cir.1959). Such circumstances include: 1) where taxable expenditures are unnecessary or are unreasonably large; 2) where the prevailing party should be penalized for unnecessarily prolonging the trial or for injecting unmeritorious issues; 3) where the prevailing party’s recovery is so insignificant that the judgment amounts to a victory for the non-prevailing party; and 4) where the case is “close and difficult.”
Id. (citing
Lichter, 269 F.2d at 146;
National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343, 362 (6th Cir.1954);
United States Plywood Corp. v. General Plywood Corp., 370 F.2d 500, 508 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 820, 88 S.Ct. 39, 42, 19 L.Ed.2d 71 (1967)). “The closeness of a case is not determined by whether one party prevails over another, but by the refinement of perception required to recognize, sift through and organize relevant evidence, and by the difficulty of discerning the law of the case.”
White & White, 786 F.2d at 732-33 (quoted in
Goostree v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 854, 864 (6th Cir.1986),
cert. denied 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1374, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987)).
A circumstance which the court is not to consider in determining whether to deny an award of costs to the prevailing party is the size of the prevailing party’s recovery and the ability of the prevailing party to pay the taxable costs. Id. at 730 & 731. Moreover, although the non-prevailing party may have demonstrated good faith in filing, prosecuting, or defending an action, such good faith is merely a relevant consideration and alone is an insufficient basis upon which to deny costs. Id.; see also Allstate v. Michigan Carpenters’ Council Health & Welfare Fund, 760 F.Supp. 665, 670 (W.D.Mich.1991). Similarly, the propriety with which the non-prevailing party conducted the litigation is merely a relevant consideration. White & White, 786 F.2d at 730. Furthermore, the court should not deny a prevailing defendant an award of costs simply because the plaintiff’s case is not frivolous. Goostree, 796 F.2d at 864.
Myrick argues that although TNT is the prevailing party, this Court should, in its discretion, deny TNT an award of costs. In support, Myrick states that he filed and prosecuted this action in good faith; that, in general, Title VII cases are of a difficult nature; and that this case was “close and difficult.” Additionally, for various reasons, Myrick argues that all of TNT’s costs listed in the memorandum of costs were unnecessary.
This Court finds that Myrick has not met his burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of awarding TNT costs. This case was not of the “close and difficult” nature envisioned in White & White, for the law itself was quite clear, as was the application of the law to the facts in this action. Moreover, the “difficult nature” of Title VII cases in general is not of such a magnitude that an award of costs to a prevailing defendant would have a significantly chilling effect on the filing of Title VII actions. Furthermore, this Court does not find that