women, see, e. g., Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, at 11 (Gen. Rogers), there was testimony that in the event of a draft of 650,000 the military could absorb some 80,000 female inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, at 1661, 1828. The 80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking down the MSSA, the District Court palpably exceeded its authority when it ignored Congress’ considered response to this fine of reasoning.
In the first place, assuming that a small number of women could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including women in draft and registration plans. “It has been suggested that all women be registered, but only a handful actually be inducted in an emergency. The Committee finds this a confused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution.” S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senate Committee recognized a year before, “training would be needlessly burdened by women recruits who could not be used in combat.” S. Rep. No. 96-226, p. 9 (1979). See also S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 159 (“Other administrative problems such as housing and different treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and physical standards would also exist”). It is not for this Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future mobilization.
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women for noncombat roles during mobilization, whether 80,000 or less, it could be met by volunteers. See id., at 160; id., at 158 (“Because of the combat restrictions, the need would be primarily for men, and women volunteers would fill the requirements for women”); House Hearings 19 (Rep. Holt). See also Hearings on S. 2294, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers).
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing noncombat positions with women during a mobilization would